Purple team lab · 2026
Active Directory Purple Team Lab
An isolated Active Directory lab connecting attack emulation with telemetry analysis and defensive recommendations.
Based on the public repository and the original technical write-up. These are recorded lab observations, not a new attack run.
Overview
Case-study summary
- Problem
- Trace an intrusion from initial access to domain compromise and assess the available telemetry.
- Architecture
- Isolated Windows Server 2022 domain, member workstation and Kali attacker.
- My contribution
- Built the lab, reproduced the attack chain and documented defensive findings.
- Tests
- Controlled credential abuse, lateral movement, DCSync, Golden Ticket and SCP scenarios.
- Outcome
- Recorded Windows Security, Sysmon and OpenSSH evidence across the attack chain.
- Limitations
- Observed events alone do not prove detections; reconnaissance needs network-level telemetry.
Lab architecture
- AttackerKali Linux
- Member workstationWS-01 · corp.local
- Domain controllerDC-01 · Windows Server 2022
What the evidence shows
Identity and privilege
Network logons, special privilege assignments and WinRM shell creation provided context around credential abuse. Event IDs include 4624, 4672 and WinRM 91.
Endpoint activity
Sysmon process creation records expose the rundll32/comsvcs.dll LSASS-dump pattern; network events provide context for LDAP and SSH activity.
Domain activity
Directory Service Access event 4662 is relevant to replication activity. A useful detection still needs the actor, rights, target and expected administrative context.
Attack stages and observed telemetry
Recorded lab evidence. Select a stage to inspect its event IDs.
- Observed event sources:
46244769 - Observed event sources:
WinRM 914672 - Observed event sources:
5379 - Observed event sources:
Sysmon 3 - Observed event sources:
OpenSSH 44624 - Observed event sources:
Sysmon 1 - Observed event sources:
4662 - Observed event sources:
Sysmon 3
Observed event sources: 4624 · 4769
Defensive recommendations
- Disable unnecessary LLMNR/NBT-NS and require Kerberos pre-authentication.
- Remove excessive service-account privileges and prevent privileged credential reuse.
- Separate administrative tiers and evaluate managed service accounts, LAPS and LSASS protection.
Limitations
A controlled personal lab with a limited host set. Observed event IDs are not proof of a matching detection or a false-positive rate. Reconnaissance requires network telemetry; workstation OS descriptions differ across the historical sources. No new runtime validation was performed for this case study.
Source review dates do not represent a new runtime test or an independent security audit.